Saturday, November 22, 2014

Bigger, Better CIRcle

One of the more fulfilling assignments in my career was in a role managing consumer debt in the Indian banking and financial services industry. I had started in mid-2007, when signs of stress were unmistakable in our portfolio, and enough to discern similar trends across the sector. They were the direct consequence of indiscriminate lending and immature borrowing practices that had been rampant earlier in the decade. Naturally, the resultant losses led to tighter credit policies and general housecleaning, with varying degrees of success, across all players.

Though mandarins at FinMin and RBI downplayed it, but this improved hygiene had a major hand in ensuring that our country emerged from GFC 2008 relatively unscathed. Thus, while capital flows and liquidity hit a reset globally, one of its key facets, namely burgeoning consumer debt and subsequent borrower impact, largely gave India a miss. I argued too, with a ringside view, that rise of credit bureaus was one of our most far-reaching gains from this period ("CIRcle of Life"). They emerged from the shadows in those days beset by uncertainty and churn, and have remained a vital cog in the industry’s wheel ever since.

GFC is now but a distant memory (save for some of us). Credit offtake has reached or exceeded pre-crisis levels in most economies globally. Consumer indebtedness is not yet a concern, including in India. Everything points to business-as-usual. Hence, it is vital that we address any gaps in credit management before lessons of 2008 are entirely forgotten.

The most visible of these is our weak credit reporting framework. Despite having moved away from Indian consumer finance (in a work sense) I still hear enough stories around inaccurate reporting of defaults, especially around old write-offs that have simply been mis-recorded. A chunk of these are false positives from identity mix-ups by CIBIL and or the lender in question. Equally, there are instances of bad data like closed credit card annual fees, collection agency fraud, disputed charge write-off etc.

No less worrisome is the imbalance of power that puts the onus for data clean-up entirely on the consumer. Processes to do so in a few banks are reasonably unfriendly too. Most important, though, is the opportunity cost. Almost all cases I know came to light when the consumer has applied for fresh credit, often for big life events like home purchase. In at least a couple of cases (till my advice to the contrary) folks were even willing to honour an incorrect demand in order to get a “clean CIBIL” (motivated by the math of charge being in hundreds versus credit need that is much larger). This is hardly kosher.

It goes without saying that the issue needs a fix at source. Banks must be taken to task for irresponsible reporting, with a threat of monetary compensation to disincentivize laxity. In most mature markets, this is secured by legislation (FCRA. CCA, Privacy Act etc). If needed, the government must consider similar consumer protection laws in India as well.

The other issue with credit reporting is coverage. There is a strong argument to expand consumer behaviour monitoring, in the Indian context, to telecom payments. The rise of wallets and payment solutions are blurring the lines here in any case. Yet, this could well be an apres moi le deluge moment. Dimensionality of credit data would multiply (volume, churn, nature of disputes etc) were this to happen. It makes it incumbent to establish the ground rules now, with a much better defined financial services scope.

Crises, as students of economics know, are cyclical by their very nature. Hence, we must act now, so as to be better prepared when the next unforeseen strikes. Lest history judge us differently.

Friday, February 28, 2014

A House Divided: The Script of AP

Andhra looms large in my Weltanschauung. Notably, I lived in Hyderabad back in 2005-07, making many friends for a lifetime (in one case, hopefully longer) during my sojourn. Scores more over the years have hailed from Telugu-land. Rare among this breed, however, were those who believed possible what shall become a reality later this year (having lived through BR turning BR + JH, I was much more sanguine). Erstwhile AP shall split, and Telangana shall be State #29 of the Union, come June 2!

Much ink has been expended on the why. Of these reasons, none is cited with more vehemence or consistency than historicity. Indeed, the idea harks back to the India of sixteen mahajanapadas in the form of Assaka. Yet, through the Satavahana, Vakataka, Chalukya, Rashtrakuta, and Kakatiya periods, the borderlines remain fluid. Come the Nizams and the 1799 alliance (which gifts Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra to the British while retaining Telangana within Hyderabad) and the map starts to take shape. Then, of course, comes the Telangana rebellion against the Nizam and the Doras, building the groundswell for Hyderabad's merger with India and culminating in Operation Polo on September 17, 1948.

Enter Potti Sreeramulu. Overcoming Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's long-held opposition, a language-based Andhra state comes into being in October 1953—almost directly in consequence of Amarajeevi's sacrifice—comprising seven Coastal region districts along with four from Rayalaseema (and no Telangana!), with Kurnool as capital. Genie out of the bottle, demands to redraw the map of India on a linguistic-regional basis proliferate across the country, forcing Nehru to appoint a States Re-organisation Commission. This is where it turns into a veritable political thriller.

The SRC, headed by the PM's beloved Fazl Ali (and including the venerable KM Panikkar, HN Kunzru et al), recommends in 1955 the formation of separate Andhra and Hyderabad states, considering economic disparity and relative misalignment in public opinion with respect to unification. Note that this is entirely in line with Nehru's concerns around the “tint of expansionist imperialism” in the Telangana-Andhra merger, with the PM going so far as to compare it to a matrimonial alliance needing “provisions for divorce” if the partners cannot get on well. At the very least, the SRC indicates a five-to-six-year cooling period before considering Vishalandhra. In a strange u-turn, a forever-sceptical PM now overrides his own SRC, not to mention earlier JVP and Dar commissions, to deliver a unified Andhra Pradesh in 1956!

Much has been speculated about Nehru's rather uncharacteristic volte-face—whether driven by blackmail by Andhra elites, the spectre of a communist Telangana, threat of royalist-Muslim revival of Azad Hyderabad dream, or a Soviet-influenced vision of mega-states. Or, perhaps more characteristically, the idealist in him was taken in by the 'Gentlemen’s Agreement' (in the main for political power sharing with a CM/Deputy CM split, a 60:40 Cabinet composition, job protections via Mulki rules, no revenue surplus diversion, and oversight via a Regional Committee as a special legislative body). Regardless, Nehru wilted, and in so doing, virtually wrote the exact script of the subsequent movement and eventual division.

Of course, in the typical arc of history, it took a few years for the union to entirely unravel. The Agreement itself was violated almost at once: Deputy CM post frequently left vacant or abolished; job quotas bypassed; Telangana surplus diverted to fund major irrigation projects in coastal Andhra etc. The ground continued to simmer: over 350 students lost their lives in 1969's First Telangana Movement; TPS won 10 of 14 seats in 1971 only to be co-opted into the Congress ranks in true Indira style; the 1973 Jai Andhra counter-movement that led to abolition of Mulki protection; and NTR's 1985 Government Order 610 to repatriate non-local appointments etc. Much was promised, little delivered, and for an illusory period of peace, it appeared that the demand for separate Telangana had petered out.

Cut to 2000. Chandrababu Naidu was at the peak of his political prowess. Having secured a crushing victory to enter his second term in 1999 and deeply allied with the ruling NDA at the center, he was internationally celebrated as a tech-savvy "CEO" Chief Minister. The Congress, led by the feisty Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy, was entirely unable to breach Naidu’s development-focused narrative. Against this backdrop, a certain K. Chandrashekar Rao, then Deputy Speaker of the Assembly and disgruntled at being denied a cabinet post, sensed a massive blind spot in Naidu's Vision-2020 plan: the severe agrarian distress and deep feelings of neglect in the Telangana region. He walked out of the TDP and formed the Telangana Rashtra Samithi. There has been no looking back since, and in just over a decade, the statehood demand has fructified.

Naturally, as clear catalysts, KCR-TRS are being feted for their contribution toward the realization of the Telangana dream. What is less obvious, and arguably more pivotal, has been the Congress's strategic role. India's GOP may or may not have orchestrated his exit from the TDP, but they intentionally elevated KCR to legitimacy, forming an alliance in 2004, and including a promise for the reorganisation of states in their common manifesto. With this, they fractured TDP’s Telangana vote bank, sending Naidu into political wilderness for the last decade. What's more, when in power, the Congress carefully sustained the Telangana issue on a slow burner to keep the TDP perpetually at loggerheads internally, utilizing this friction to encourage a steady stream of desertions that have severely hollowed out Naidu’s regional leadership. For now, at least in Telangana, it appears bye-bye TDP.

Where does that leave the Congress? The bifurcation has obviously been inspired by massive anti-incumbency both nationally and regionally. Fact is that much of their woes are the outcome of a sense of entitlement and being too smart for their own good. This move appears no different. Thus, in the Congress high command's calculation, the division finishes Naidu off forever, checkmates a rising Jagan Mohan Reddy, and hopefully gains KCR as a long-term ally (for an eventual merger). I would be surprised by either outcome. Naidu will now double down on residual Andhra, and it is likely to be a two-way fight between him and Jagan for the foreseeable future. And KCR is unlikely to share power when he can reign absolutely. Eventually, the plan backfires on the Congress itself.

In summary, yes, one must justifiably expect celebrations galore in Telangana and KCR-mahal come June 2. And yet again, the fortunes of the country and its states have been held hostage to the Congress's partisan machinations and short-termist outlook. Chacha Nehru then, Sonia Gandhi now. Here's to hoping that this script changes nationally soon...