Those 'bureaucratic gaffes' were, of course, only the latest in a long history of ignominy (Kargil, 26/11, David Headley, and the Red Corridor being but a few of its more sordid recent chapters). Questions were asked of Indian intelligence, or the lack of it. In response we were told to think beyond the CBI, NIA, IB, and RAW, all under our venerable Home Minister's charge, to NATGRID, his new pet project. NATGRID would allow 11 security agencies access to 21 linked databases covering financial, travel, immigration, asset ownership, telephone, and internet usage information for individuals and entities in the country.
Arguments had been made against a NATGRID-style response. There were concerns around diffusing focus away from building good ol' Hum-Int with a grandiose but potentially ineffective programme. For instance, it may not raise any alert for an American citizen with Caucasian looks and no cellphone or financial records in his name (save, perhaps, every itinerary with return via Pakistan — potentially indicative of an ISI-LeT nexus but equally high volume, Type I error risk) thereby missing a Headley entirely. Furthermore, the potential for an assault on personal liberty and data privacy with the Government's power to obtain sensitive information without warrant or consent, bred its own share of D Thomases.
Resolution to these concerns, naturally, lay in a fully thought-through approach. Last week's order notifying the creation of NCTC, alas, displays none of this sure-footedness. In typical PC fashion, it managed to raise hackles all over instead. Opposition-ruled states are up in arms, for one, when Center-State cooperation is vital for seamless execution. Likewise, we have conflicts within GOI's own framework with RAW (external intel), NTRO (collection & analysis), and NIA (investigation & prosecution) — all with mandates broader than counter-terrorism. Nesting NCTC under the IB, a body sans parliamentary sanction or oversight, too reeks of shoddy legal formulation, if not downright empire-building on part of the Home Min.
PC apologists may point out that feedback has gone into the current notification vis-à-vis his original plan (the IB centenary endowment lecture, Dec 2009). That vision subsumed the NIA, NTRO, NCRB, and NSG under the NCTC, along with counter-terror operations of RAW and the CBI. Yet, even if watered-down, NCTC remains deeply flawed, most notably in its lack of separation between analytical and operative powers. Add lack of due governance to that, and we can put the famed US military-industrial complex to shame in its reach. I hope sense prevails soon, with a better design that helps our counter-terror effort acquire effective teeth. No terrorism-frontline State (for we are unmistakably one) worth its salt should settle for any less.

