By all accounts, Shri P Chidambaram, our Home Minister, does not take kindly to fools. Nor, can stakes be higher than on Terror, with multiple strikes over the few years highlighting our extraordinarily vulnerable national security status. Yet, when GoI shared a "50 Most Wanted" dossier with Pakistan a few months ago, it was a disgrace (two on the list were in India). That very fortnight, CBI's pursuit of Kim Davy (Purulia arms drop notoriety) in Denmark ended with egg on the face owing to an "expired" extradition notice.
Those 'bureaucratic gaffes' were, of course, only the latest in long history of ignominy (Kargil, 26/11, David Headley, Red Corridor being but a few of its more sordid chapters). Questions were asked of Indian intelligence, or the lack of it. In response we were told to think beyond the CBI, NIA, IB and RAW, all under our venerable Home Minister's charge, to NATGRID, his pet project. NATGRID would allow 11 security agencies access to 21 linked databases covering financial, travel, immigration, asset ownership, telephone and internet usage information for individuals and entities in the country.
Arguments had been made against a NATGRID style response. There were concerns around diffusing focus away from building good ol' Hum-Int with a grandiose but potentially ineffective programme. For instance, it may not raise any alert for an American citizen with Caucasian looks, no cellphone or financial records in his name (save, perhaps, every itinerary with return via Pakistan; an obvious need to brief ISI-LeT) thereby missing Headley. Equally, the potential for assault on personal liberty and data privacy with Government's power to obtain sensitive information without warrant or consent, bred its own share of D Thomases.
Resolution to these, naturally, lay in a well-considered approach. Last week's order notifying the creation of NCTC, alas, displays none of this sure-footedness. In typical PC fashion, it managed to raise hackles all over instead. Opposition-ruled states are up in arms, for one, when Center-State cooperation would be ideal for seamless execution. Likewise, we have conflicts within GoI's own framework with RAW (external intel); NTRO (collection and analysis); and NIA (investigation and prosecution), all of whom have mandates broader than counterterrorism. Nesting the NCTC under the IB, a body sans parliamentary sanction or oversight, too reeks of shoddy legal formulation, if not downright empire-building on part of the Home Min.
PC apologists may point out that feedback has gone into the current notification vis-a-vis his original plan (IB centenary endowment lecture; Dec 2009). This had the NIA, NTRO, NCRB and NSG under the NCTC; as also the counter-terror work of RAW and CBI. Yet, even if watered-down, NCTC remains deeply flawed, most notably in its lack of separation of analytical and operative powers. Add lack of governaceto that, and we can put the US miliatry-industrial complex to shame in its reach. I hope sense prevails soon, with a better design that helps our counterterrorism effort acquire effective teeth. No terrorism-frontline State (for we are unmistakably one) worth its salt should settle for any less.
Those 'bureaucratic gaffes' were, of course, only the latest in long history of ignominy (Kargil, 26/11, David Headley, Red Corridor being but a few of its more sordid chapters). Questions were asked of Indian intelligence, or the lack of it. In response we were told to think beyond the CBI, NIA, IB and RAW, all under our venerable Home Minister's charge, to NATGRID, his pet project. NATGRID would allow 11 security agencies access to 21 linked databases covering financial, travel, immigration, asset ownership, telephone and internet usage information for individuals and entities in the country.
Arguments had been made against a NATGRID style response. There were concerns around diffusing focus away from building good ol' Hum-Int with a grandiose but potentially ineffective programme. For instance, it may not raise any alert for an American citizen with Caucasian looks, no cellphone or financial records in his name (save, perhaps, every itinerary with return via Pakistan; an obvious need to brief ISI-LeT) thereby missing Headley. Equally, the potential for assault on personal liberty and data privacy with Government's power to obtain sensitive information without warrant or consent, bred its own share of D Thomases.
Resolution to these, naturally, lay in a well-considered approach. Last week's order notifying the creation of NCTC, alas, displays none of this sure-footedness. In typical PC fashion, it managed to raise hackles all over instead. Opposition-ruled states are up in arms, for one, when Center-State cooperation would be ideal for seamless execution. Likewise, we have conflicts within GoI's own framework with RAW (external intel); NTRO (collection and analysis); and NIA (investigation and prosecution), all of whom have mandates broader than counterterrorism. Nesting the NCTC under the IB, a body sans parliamentary sanction or oversight, too reeks of shoddy legal formulation, if not downright empire-building on part of the Home Min.
PC apologists may point out that feedback has gone into the current notification vis-a-vis his original plan (IB centenary endowment lecture; Dec 2009). This had the NIA, NTRO, NCRB and NSG under the NCTC; as also the counter-terror work of RAW and CBI. Yet, even if watered-down, NCTC remains deeply flawed, most notably in its lack of separation of analytical and operative powers. Add lack of governaceto that, and we can put the US miliatry-industrial complex to shame in its reach. I hope sense prevails soon, with a better design that helps our counterterrorism effort acquire effective teeth. No terrorism-frontline State (for we are unmistakably one) worth its salt should settle for any less.
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