Cards, Cars and Gold Czars

"Lucky you; a Credit Card in hand fresh off the boat!" or words to that effect. Thus went the refrain, notably from friends having made a similar India-to-US move mid-career; and thereafter grappled with the task of rebuilding a financial profile from scratch.

Fact is that, absent a Bureau score, many of us who wash ashore have to face the rather mortifying experience of credit denial(s). Some are forced to resort to Secured cards to build payment history. Therefore, the modest $1500 limit from BofA (I had higher in my first credit card as a mere student graduating from IIFT 20 years ago) felt like an occasion to celebrate!

Part of the distress, to be fair, comes from the dissonance between the erstwhile financial standing in India (while no HNW, one had the pick of financial products; and a feeling of being chased rather than chasing) to newbie status in the US of A. Mind you, this would be equally true even with a global bank; one you had used in India for years; and carried some priority status. Your creditworthiness is reset perforce.

So, with prospective landlords looking askance and utilities insisting on bank auto-debit of monthly bills, a credit card felt much like being granted the Moon. Why not use your India plastic, you ask? Unfortunately, that would be akin to kicking the can down the road. Even if you found a way past the international usage surcharge with an appropriate card, it would still not solve for the need to have usage and payment history domestically to build your credit profile (circular logic, did you say?).

Thankfully, there is a potential hack, and a doubly sweet one at that. AMEX, as I found out last week, could give you a charge card based mostly on your India relationship (albeit driven more by their customer service ethic than hyper-connectedness of the world)! Equally, this 'no limit' card saves me from needing to pre-pay my original credit card multiple times intra-month (when paltry limits meet large household set-up expenses). Note, therefore, my unequivocal endorsement for the 'Gold' in its name!

Next pit-stop in the finanical reset journey, is a car. Once again, as I shortlist, it is evident that usurious rates of interest await me on the loan. Neither will the humbling experience end quite there. Given recency of relocation, a lack of intimacy with domestic stocks is only to be expected. Ergo, I have miles to go to attain the next goal (of high-conviction stockpicking ideas). Till then, we soldier on, as we must.

Bigger, Better CIRcle

One of the more fulfilling assignments in my career was in a role managing consumer debt in the Indian banking and financial services industry. I had started in mid-2007, when signs of stress were unmistakable in our portfolio, and enough to discern similar trends across the sector. They were the direct consequence of indiscriminate lending and immature borrowing practices that had been rampant earlier in the decade. Naturally, the resultant losses led to tighter credit policies and general housecleaning, with varying degrees of success, across all players.

Though mandarins at FinMin and RBI downplayed it, but this improved hygiene had a major hand in ensuring that our country emerged from GFC 2008 relatively unscathed. Thus, while capital flows and liquidity hit a reset globally, one of its key facets, namely burgeoning consumer debt and subsequent borrower impact, largely gave India a miss. I argued too, with a ringside view, that rise of credit bureaus was one of our most far-reaching gains from this period ("CIRcle of Life"). They emerged from the shadows in those days beset by uncertainty and churn, and have remained a vital cog in the industry’s wheel ever since.

GFC is now but a distant memory (save for some of us). Credit offtake has reached or exceeded pre-crisis levels in most economies globally. Consumer indebtedness is not yet a concern, including in India. Everything points to business-as-usual. Hence, it is vital that we address any gaps in credit management before lessons of 2008 are entirely forgotten.

The most visible of these is our weak credit reporting framework. Despite having moved away from Indian consumer finance (in a work sense) I still hear enough stories around inaccurate reporting of defaults, especially around old write-offs that have simply been mis-recorded. A chunk of these are false positives from identity mix-ups by CIBIL and or the lender in question. Equally, there are instances of bad data like closed credit card annual fees, collection agency fraud, disputed charge write-off etc.

No less worrisome is the imbalance of power that puts the onus for data clean-up entirely on the consumer. Processes to do so in a few banks are reasonably unfriendly too. Most important, though, is the opportunity cost. Almost all cases I know came to light when the consumer has applied for fresh credit, often for big life events like home purchase. In at least a couple of cases (till my advice to the contrary) folks were even willing to honour an incorrect demand in order to get a “clean CIBIL” (motivated by the math of charge being in hundreds versus credit need that is much larger). This is hardly kosher.

It goes without saying that the issue needs a fix at source. Banks must be taken to task for irresponsible reporting, with a threat of monetary compensation to disincentivize laxity. In most mature markets, this is secured by legislation (FCRA. CCA, Privacy Act etc). If needed, the government must consider similar consumer protection laws in India as well.

The other issue with credit reporting is coverage. There is a strong argument to expand consumer behaviour monitoring, in the Indian context, to telecom payments. The rise of wallets and payment solutions are blurring the lines here in any case. Yet, this could well be an apres moi le deluge moment. Dimensionality of credit data would multiply (volume, churn, nature of disputes etc) were this to happen. It makes it incumbent to establish the ground rules now, with a much better defined financial services scope.

Crises, as students of economics know, are cyclical by their very nature. Hence, we must act now, so as to be better prepared when the next unforeseen strikes. Lest history judge us differently.

2B Or Nought 2B

A degree in Economics and early years trading commodities mean that the markets hold me in an enduring thrall. I mostly restrict my passion to delivery trades though; F&O action is rare. Equally, those that I talk equities with are folks that classify more as investors than traders. This means that margin speculation is around the fringes of my stockpicking existence.

I was, however, greatly intrigued with JP Morgan Chase's losses on account of derivatives trade last quarter. For one, the amount involved was an obscene $2B (frankly, my imagination runs short when faced with such astronomical sums, for reasons not entirely unrelated to my humble circumstances)! I hear too that many believe the actual hole to be at least twice that ungodly number (phew).

Of course, markets are replete with instances of mindnumbing losses. I was in College when Nick 'I'm Sorry' Leeson brought down Barings. He was neither the first, nor last, in a long line of operators whose avarice or ambition (but almost never ineptitude) delivered similar shocks. Indeed, the trail of destruction in their wake often had more than a fair share of the humble investor in addition to institution in question.

Naturally, it begets the question as to how organizations of considerable repute come to such massive grief. These are not easy to reconcile with the high quality of internal talent either (case in point: Jamie Dimon has been a star in an industry under intense public scrutiny of late). We ought to know of process or technology inadequacies that resulted in failure to detect and correct the situation.

In the current instance, for starters, let us rule out that Options as a financial product itself is an issue. Arguing this is like blaming steel for knife-wounds in ghetto crime. That out of the way, the picture is no less messy, with mismanaged hedges at JPMC's London Treasury at its core. The sequence went thus:

JPMC, like any commercial bank with funds in its charge, needs to optimize returns (invest in high quality, long term bonds) vs liquidity (via overnight money market, at near zero interest in a QE world). Too much liquidity lowers the spread between investment returns and what the bank pays depositors; too little risks it running out of cash. Bond investments need protection too, since prices vary inversely with interest rate. When rate moves up it is a double whammy for the bank: its investments erode in value, and it coughs up a larger 'share' of returns due to increased interest outflow. Naturally, banks hedge such exposure, including through Credit Default Swaps (bankruptcy-protection instruments).

By all accounts, JPMC's Treasury at London was running huge positions. This forced them to trade massively in a relatively small, illiquid CDS market as a hedge strategy. This created price skews that drew hedge funds (and others) seeking arbitrage opportunities. Continued aggression from 'London Whale', however, meant that the distortions grew larger (valuations changed an unheard-of 50% in three months). Pressure on CDS market players mounted: the game was too expensive and prolonged. They were angry, but could do little in an unregulated market with the Whale running amok.

If this was bad, it soon turned worse. Perhaps realizing limitations of the original CDS hedge strategy, Whale & Co devised new plans. Defying logic, they got into related but riskier instruments, with further exposure to volatility. Hedge funds started to sense the desperation and waited for the nut to crack.

Meanwhile, this had rung alarm bells within JPMC too. Reinforcements from the core i-banking unit were sent to London Treasury. It did not take them long to figure out how untenable and inherently risky JPMC's position was. They wanted out, presenting the perfect revenge opportunity to hedge funds and CDS market punters. To liquidate the trades, these players wanted their price. $2B, or more, is this pound of flesh.

Perhaps I am guilty of over-simplification (for more gory details, refer an excellent article on the Whale at Seeking Alpha). Regardless, the episode throws up a few conclusions. The most critical is the need to regulate such specialized (and illiquid) markets. Another lesson is the limitations in deploying narrowly defined, fixed technical strategies to mitigate risk.

In an 'Occupy Wall St' backdrop, it is worthwhile to note too that this was not a case of i-banking excesses that have fired up public imagination and invited lawmaker attention lately. In fact the scene of crime at Chase commercial bank Treasury in London is far removed from JP Morgan i-bank. Of course, the starring role for CDSs is a throwback to GFC, but that's about all (or an 'ought-to-regulate' lesson at max).

Unless you own JPMC stock, therefore, the pall of gloom and hyper-suspicion is somewhat ill-founded. A sigh of relief too, may not be out of line. Until, of course, the next quake strikes.

CIRcle of Life

Generally speaking, from the universe of my acquaintances in the thirty-some years on the planet, the set from School would be in summary the oldest and most valued of relationships. To boot, a majority of this group would rate higher than average in terms of phrenic acumen as well as worldly success. Hence, when no less than three such friends seek me out in the space of a few weeks with queries on financial products, all centred around the theme of credit history, something does seem amiss in the State of Denmark!

Proceeding under the assumption that a general outbreak of penury has not gripped the Class of 1991 (and the financial transactions intended certainly pointed in the opposite direction!) the spate of enquiries was highly suggestive. My direct hypothesis was our collective lack of appreciation for Credit Bureaus and their rapidly expanding sway in India's financial system. (Incidentally, using the plural is accurate, though only Credit Information Bureau India Ltd or CIBIL is completely operational; Experian shall be the second Bureau and more are in the pipeline). A quick primer therefore seems in order.

Simply put, a Credit Information Company or Credit Bureau is a repository of credit histories of individuals and companies. It is premised on the principle of pooled information - all member banks and FIs share credit line and payment data with it - intended to facilitate better credit decisions for lenders as much as appropriate terms for borrowers. Bureau data is formatted into a Credit Information Report or CIR which can be accessed by member institutions and the concerned consumer or commercial entity. It is this CIR that is increasingly being leveraged to assess creditworthiness in India as we speak - a decades long practice in the developed world.

Therein of course lies the rub. The widespread usage of CIR is a relatively recent development and customer awareness has been potentially inadequate. Combined, this has meant low motivation to keep Bureau data entirely accurate and updated, leading to a good chunk of borrowers being not-so-pleasantly surprised by their CIR's contents (and hence those calls to folks like me). Bureaus are mostly not to blame though - apart from their impeccable credentials (CIBIL for instance was cofounded by SBI and HDFC with SME's D&B and TransUnion), inaccuracy of information strikes at their very raison d'etre. Similar vested interest may have been presumed for Banks/ FIs but unfortunately in CIBIL's nascent days a good chunk of members were curiously over-protective of their databases, loath to share vital information with the others. (That this futile stance changed is in significant measure due to the 2008 Crisis, when the industry woke up to dangers of one-upmanship!) There may have been infrastructure issues in data capture and storage in the past too, especially with PSU players. And last but not least, consumers may have been less than responsible with closure of seemingly trivial issues, including occcasional wilful default, all leading up to a messed up CIR.

As things stand, the CIR is now a part of life (a common misconception is that only delinquent accounts get reported to Bureaus - not so, they carry all records). In fact we should consider it a near certainty that CIR usage shall transcend beyond lending decisions to Utilities and other necessities of life. It is also obvious that information capture and permanence will be in a different league post Aadhar implementation. It is indeed not impossible to envision the CIR become an input for employment decisions (say, in BFSI or for company directorship etc), perhaps even indirectly impinge on social contracts (public office for instance) going forward.

Meanwhile, for those with current or future borrowing needs (almost everyone in modern India's consumerist paradigm) and at all concerned with credit availability and terms (pricing is obvious; equally credit delayed may be credit too late - ask folks foregoing cash discounts when buying that new house), an impeccable credit history is highly desired. Also, even as you get disciplined in future payments, check your current CIR from CIBIL at www.cibil.com/accesscredit.htm as first step (errors if any will have to be corrected via your Bank/ FI that has reported them so write to it for rectification). The time to act is now!