A degree in Economics and early years trading commodities mean that the markets hold me in an enduring thrall. I mostly restrict my passion to delivery trades though; F&O action is rare. Equally, those that I talk equities with are folks that classify more as investors than traders. This means that margin speculation is around the fringes of my stockpicking existence.
I was, however, greatly intrigued with JP Morgan Chase's losses on account of derivatives trade last quarter. For one, the amount involved was an obscene $2B (frankly, my imagination runs short when faced with such astronomical sums, for reasons not entirely unrelated to my humble circumstances)! I hear too that many believe the actual hole to be at least twice that ungodly number (phew).
Of course, markets are replete with instances of mindnumbing losses. I was in College when Nick 'I'm Sorry' Leeson brought down Barings. He was neither the first, nor last, in a long line of operators whose avarice or ambition (but almost never ineptitude) delivered similar shocks. Indeed, the trail of destruction in their wake often had more than a fair share of the humble investor in addition to institution in question.
Naturally, it begets the question as to how organizations of considerable repute come to such massive grief. These are not easy to reconcile with the high quality of internal talent either (case in point: Jamie Dimon has been a star in an industry under intense public scrutiny of late). We ought to know of process or technology inadequacies that resulted in failure to detect and correct the situation.
In the current instance, for starters, let us rule out that Options as a financial product itself is an issue. Arguing this is like blaming steel for knife-wounds in ghetto crime. That out of the way, the picture is no less messy, with mismanaged hedges at JPMC's London Treasury at its core. The sequence went thus:
JPMC, like any commercial bank with funds in its charge, needs to optimize returns (invest in high quality, long term bonds) vs liquidity (via overnight money market, at near zero interest in a QE world). Too much liquidity lowers the spread between investment returns and what the bank pays depositors; too little risks it running out of cash. Bond investments need protection too, since prices vary inversely with interest rate. When rate moves up it is a double whammy for the bank: its investments erode in value, and it coughs up a larger 'share' of returns due to increased interest outflow. Naturally, banks hedge such exposure, including through Credit Default Swaps (bankruptcy-protection instruments).
By all accounts, JPMC's Treasury at London was running huge positions. This forced them to trade massively in a relatively small, illiquid CDS market as a hedge strategy. This created price skews that drew hedge funds (and others) seeking arbitrage opportunities. Continued aggression from 'London Whale', however, meant that the distortions grew larger (valuations changed an unheard-of 50% in three months). Pressure on CDS market players mounted: the game was too expensive and prolonged. They were angry, but could do little in an unregulated market with the Whale running amok.
If this was bad, it soon turned worse. Perhaps realizing limitations of the original CDS hedge strategy, Whale & Co devised new plans. Defying logic, they got into related but riskier instruments, with further exposure to volatility. Hedge funds started to sense the desperation and waited for the nut to crack.
Meanwhile, this had rung alarm bells within JPMC too. Reinforcements from the core i-banking unit were sent to London Treasury. It did not take them long to figure out how untenable and inherently risky JPMC's position was. They wanted out, presenting the perfect revenge opportunity to hedge funds and CDS market punters. To liquidate the trades, these players wanted their price. $2B, or more, is this pound of flesh.
Perhaps I am guilty of over-simplification (for more gory details, refer an excellent article on the Whale at Seeking Alpha). Regardless, the episode throws up a few conclusions. The most critical is the need to regulate such specialized (and illiquid) markets. Another lesson is the limitations in deploying narrowly defined, fixed technical strategies to mitigate risk.
In an 'Occupy Wall St' backdrop, it is worthwhile to note too that this was not a case of i-banking excesses that have fired up public imagination and invited lawmaker attention lately. In fact the scene of crime at Chase commercial bank Treasury in London is far removed from JP Morgan i-bank. Of course, the starring role for CDSs is a throwback to GFC, but that's about all (or an 'ought-to-regulate' lesson at max).
Unless you own JPMC stock, therefore, the pall of gloom and hyper-suspicion is somewhat ill-founded. A sigh of relief too, may not be out of line. Until, of course, the next quake strikes.
I was, however, greatly intrigued with JP Morgan Chase's losses on account of derivatives trade last quarter. For one, the amount involved was an obscene $2B (frankly, my imagination runs short when faced with such astronomical sums, for reasons not entirely unrelated to my humble circumstances)! I hear too that many believe the actual hole to be at least twice that ungodly number (phew).
Of course, markets are replete with instances of mindnumbing losses. I was in College when Nick 'I'm Sorry' Leeson brought down Barings. He was neither the first, nor last, in a long line of operators whose avarice or ambition (but almost never ineptitude) delivered similar shocks. Indeed, the trail of destruction in their wake often had more than a fair share of the humble investor in addition to institution in question.
Naturally, it begets the question as to how organizations of considerable repute come to such massive grief. These are not easy to reconcile with the high quality of internal talent either (case in point: Jamie Dimon has been a star in an industry under intense public scrutiny of late). We ought to know of process or technology inadequacies that resulted in failure to detect and correct the situation.
In the current instance, for starters, let us rule out that Options as a financial product itself is an issue. Arguing this is like blaming steel for knife-wounds in ghetto crime. That out of the way, the picture is no less messy, with mismanaged hedges at JPMC's London Treasury at its core. The sequence went thus:
JPMC, like any commercial bank with funds in its charge, needs to optimize returns (invest in high quality, long term bonds) vs liquidity (via overnight money market, at near zero interest in a QE world). Too much liquidity lowers the spread between investment returns and what the bank pays depositors; too little risks it running out of cash. Bond investments need protection too, since prices vary inversely with interest rate. When rate moves up it is a double whammy for the bank: its investments erode in value, and it coughs up a larger 'share' of returns due to increased interest outflow. Naturally, banks hedge such exposure, including through Credit Default Swaps (bankruptcy-protection instruments).
By all accounts, JPMC's Treasury at London was running huge positions. This forced them to trade massively in a relatively small, illiquid CDS market as a hedge strategy. This created price skews that drew hedge funds (and others) seeking arbitrage opportunities. Continued aggression from 'London Whale', however, meant that the distortions grew larger (valuations changed an unheard-of 50% in three months). Pressure on CDS market players mounted: the game was too expensive and prolonged. They were angry, but could do little in an unregulated market with the Whale running amok.
If this was bad, it soon turned worse. Perhaps realizing limitations of the original CDS hedge strategy, Whale & Co devised new plans. Defying logic, they got into related but riskier instruments, with further exposure to volatility. Hedge funds started to sense the desperation and waited for the nut to crack.
Meanwhile, this had rung alarm bells within JPMC too. Reinforcements from the core i-banking unit were sent to London Treasury. It did not take them long to figure out how untenable and inherently risky JPMC's position was. They wanted out, presenting the perfect revenge opportunity to hedge funds and CDS market punters. To liquidate the trades, these players wanted their price. $2B, or more, is this pound of flesh.
Perhaps I am guilty of over-simplification (for more gory details, refer an excellent article on the Whale at Seeking Alpha). Regardless, the episode throws up a few conclusions. The most critical is the need to regulate such specialized (and illiquid) markets. Another lesson is the limitations in deploying narrowly defined, fixed technical strategies to mitigate risk.
In an 'Occupy Wall St' backdrop, it is worthwhile to note too that this was not a case of i-banking excesses that have fired up public imagination and invited lawmaker attention lately. In fact the scene of crime at Chase commercial bank Treasury in London is far removed from JP Morgan i-bank. Of course, the starring role for CDSs is a throwback to GFC, but that's about all (or an 'ought-to-regulate' lesson at max).
Unless you own JPMC stock, therefore, the pall of gloom and hyper-suspicion is somewhat ill-founded. A sigh of relief too, may not be out of line. Until, of course, the next quake strikes.
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